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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KATHRYN TUCK COATS,
Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 920588-CA

PETER M. COATS,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND
CROSS APPELLEE

This brief filed by Peter Coats is in reply to the arguments
raised by his former wife Kathryn Coats as to his original appeal
and as to her cross appeal.

Appellant believes there is a major

distinction between these two appeals.

Appellant's appeal

concerns assertions that the lower court made mistakes in its
ruling after certain discretionary decisions, those which could
have gone either way, were ultimately decided by the court.
Appellee Kathryn Tuck Coats, on the other hand, mainly urges that
the discretionary decisions of the court are erroneous.

This

distinction will be readily seen during the discussion portion of
this brief.
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1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT APPROXIMATELY $148,000 IN TRUST
DEED NOTES WERE PART OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE SUBJECT TO DIVISION WHEN SUCH
NOTES CAME FROM NON-MARITAL FUNDS OF
THE KIDDER-PEABODY ACCOUNT, WERE ALL
ISSUED AFTER THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED,
AND WERE ALL PAYABLE BACK INTO THE
KIDDER-PEABODY FUND.
Before discussing the arguments raised by appellee Kathryn
Coats, it is useful to briefly review the circumstances
surrounding the Kidder-Peabody account which is the subject of
this claimed error.

{

{

As noted in Appellant's opening Brief, this

account existed prior to the marriage, was always listed solely in
Peter Coats' name, and had been funded from Peter's grandparents.

{

Had this account remained entirely intact during the marriage,
there is little doubt under this Court's previous decision that
the account would be considered as premarital and inherited
property and would not be subject to division.
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App.

1990).

See Burt v. Burt,

However, during the course of

the marriage this account was extensively utilized by the
appellant in his personal and business dealings.

Appellee Kathryn

Coats maintained that this type of co-mingling rendered the
account marital property including all offsprings from such
account.

Conversely, appellant Peter Coats conceded that whenever

money was withdrawn from the account and used for family purposes
that such money became part of the marital estate.

He maintained,

however, that all other money which was used in his business and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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returned into the account remained non-marital property.
Because this account constituted some $400,000 it was a major
item of dispute between the parties.

The evidence introduced by

both sides as to the use of this account during the marriage
consumed a large portion of the trial and its evidence.

Because

of this dispute it was necessary to propose various alternatives
with and without this assset considered as marital property.
Likewise, the promissory notes which were funded by this account
during the marriage also required double treatment.

Peter Coats

maintained that these promissory notes were exclusively his own
property since they were derived from the Kidder-Peabody account
and in at least half of the cases were paid directly back into the
account.

(Tr.

915). His accountant maintained that these notes

were merely conversions into another form of the Kidder-Peabody
account.

(Tr.

1363).

Appellant was aware, however, that if the

Court ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account was marital property
then these note receivables would also become marital property
subject to division.

For that reason appellant Peter Coats was

forced to alternatively argue that these notes should not be
considered at full value but should be discounted because of the
difficulty in collecting them.

(Tr.

1153-66).

Kathryn Tuck Coats argued throughout the trial that since the
Kidder-Peabody account was a marital asset then all notes which
eminated from such account also became a marital asset.

See

Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 which was Kathryn Coats proposed marital
asset division including the Kidder-Peabody account.

Moreover,

she maintained that even if the Kidder-Peabody account itself was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not considered a marital asset, that the notes eminating from it
became marital property subject to division.

See Plaintiff's

Exhibt 91.
Had the lower court ruled in favor of appellee Kathryn Coats
that the Kidder-Peabody account was marital property, then there
is no doubt that the promissory notes executed both before the
divorce was finalized in 1991 and those issued after such event
would all be subject to marital division.

Simplistically, it

would be analogous to a husband having a marital bank account
which is utilized to purchase and keep automobiles both before and
after the parties have been legally divorced.

In such a case

since the funds are determined to be marital property any
conversion of such funds would likewise be marital property.
Using this same analogy, if a court determines that such
account is the separate property of the husband, then any
purchases he makes that can be traceable to such funds either
before finalization of the divorce or after would still remain his
separate property.

The mere fact that the form of the property

has been changed does not affect the result.
Appellant Peter Coats, therefore, could have appealed to this
Court as to all the notes determined by the lower court to be
marital property: those issued prior to February of 1991 and those
issued after February 1991.

However, because there was evidence

that the proceeds of the pre-divorce notes sometimes did not go
back into the Kidder-Peabody account but went to other funds or
for other purposes, such an argument has not been made.

In

effect, Appellant concedes that those notes prior to his divorce
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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could be considered part of the marital assets even though the
initial funds were derived exclusively from the Kidder-Peabody
account.
As to those notes that were issued after the divorce was
final, however, there can be no room for argument.

Appellant

carefully issued each note in his real estate business to be
payable back into "The Kidder-Peabody Account." Kathryn was no
longer living with him and therefore there was no co-mingling of
assets or liabilities.

Once it was determined by the lower court

that the Kidder-Peabody account was exclusively his, then it had
to follow as a matter of law that any conversion of such funds
into another form was also his exclusive property.

Had he

purchased five antique automobiles in June of 1991 with the
Kidder-Peabody money it cannot be said, under any circumstances,
that these automobiles would be subject to marital division.
Appellant utilized the Kidder-Peabody money after his divorce
for purely business purposes.

Because of the availability of this

money he was able to transact numerous real estate loans by
lending buyers sufficient funds to make their purchases.

This

enabled him to receive in some cases two commissions as well as to
receive a return on his money from the borrower.

However, this

use of the money was insignificant when compared with the fact
that 50 percent of the value of the notes was taken from him by
the property division.

Thus, Mr. Coats was essentially penalized

some $59,000 because he chose to use the money in the
Kidder-Peabody account rather than letting it merely sit there
where no claim by his former wife could be made.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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With this background it now remains to examine the specific
arguments raised by Mrs. Coats.
A.

The Issue Concerning These Promissory Notes
Was Raised Below.

Appellee Kathryn Coats has reviewed some of the testimony in
this case concerning the promissory notes.

She claims that the

argument now raised by Appellant was not raised below.
her own citations clearly show this was not the case.

However,
Appellant's

attorney in introducing Exhibit 78 clearly stated that the purpose
of such exhibits was to trace the funds out of the Kidder-Peabody
account in order to show that they were separate property.
Appellee's Brief, p.

(See

9). Moreover, Exhibit 78 contained all of

the notes that were executed after the parties had been divorced
in February of 1991.

Again, in his closing argument Mr. Larew

clearly stated that the identity of these promissory notes had not
been lost and had not been co-mingled with other funds.

As he

stated and as was quoted by Appellee, "The promissory notes used
funds coming out of the Kidder-Peabody.

We maintain those are the

sole property of Mr. Coats because they have not been co-mingled
or lost through exchange.
readily traceable." (Tr.

They were clearly identified and
1305, Appellee's Brief, p. 11).

Appellee seems to assert that Mr. Coats was required to
separately argue pre-separation notes from post-separation notes.
In fact, however, as stated above, the same principle applied to
all such notes regardless of when they were issued.

If they could

be shown to have eminated from the Kidder-Peabody account and to
have gone directly back to it, then such notes would be the
separate property of Mr. Coats.
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Mr. Coats has elected, however, for purposes of this appeal
to focus only upon the post-divorce notes to eliminate any
arguments which could be advanced as to the ultimate use of funds
from the pre-divorce notes.

This narrowing of the issues was Mr.

Coats' own choice for purposes of this appeal.

However, the lower

court was fully apprised of Appellant's argument that all of the
notes, including the post-divorce notes, were the separate
property of Mr. Coats since they were traceable from the
Kidder-Peabody account.
Appellee argues that because Exhibits P-90 and P-91 were
introduced into evidence that somehow this was an admission by
Appellant that these notes were part of the marital property.

It

is obvious, however, that both of these exhibits were the
proposals of the appellee as to how the property should be
classified and divided.

Certainly, Appellant could make no

objection to Kathryn Coats' proposal as to how she believed a
division should be made.
Likewise, the fact that Appellant listed these assets in his
own Exhibit 59 is of no consequence since Exhibit 59 includes all
of his assets both marital and separate.

As noted by Appellee

herself concerning the testimony relating to this exhibit,
"Defendant did not ever testify as to what assets were not marital
other than the Kidder-Peabody account." (Appellee's Brief, p. 9).
For these reasons, therefore, the issue of the promissory
notes was sufficiently raised in the lower court and has been
preserved for this appeal.
B.

The Inclusion of $148,000 in Notes as
Part of the Marital Estate Was Erroneous.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellee argues that the lower court correctly included all
of these notes as marital property based upon the same arguments
she advanced at trial that the Kidder-Peabody account itself was
marital property.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 11-13).

Of course, the

lower court rejected this testimony and concluded that the
Kidder-Peabody account should remain the sole property of Peter
Coats.

All of the testimony by Appellee's accountant concerned

the use of these accounts prior to their divorce.

Whatever may be

said for those notes that were issued before February of 1991, no
such arguments can be made as to those issued after February 1991.
Obviously, since the parties were separated none of these
contentions advanced by Appellee's accountant would have any
validity after February 1991.
C.

In This Case, The Marital Estate Was
Determined at the Time of Trial.

Appellee maintains that Mr. Coats is arguing that the
$148,000 in promissory notes should have been valued at the time
of the separation and not the time of trial.
pp.
App.

13-14).

(Appellee's Brief,

She relies upon Howe v. Howe, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah

1991) as her authority, that all assets must be valued at

time of trial.
such a rule.

It is questionable that the Howe case establishes

See Hoagland v. Hoaqland, 852 P.2d 1025 (Utah App.

1993) (Bench, J. and Jackson, J.

concurring).

In any event,

however, the estate was not valued by the lower court at the time
of the divorce but was valued at the time of trial.

There is no

doubt that both parties placed values upon the Kidder-Peabody
account as of the time of trial.

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 98;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant's Exhibit 58). Had the lower court ruled that the
Kidder-Peabody account was subject to marital division such
division would have been based upon the value of the account in
June of 1992.
Had appellant Peter Coats not utilized any of the
Kidder-Peabody money for his bridge loans, then the balance of
such account as of the time of trial would have been the same
(plus interest) as it was in February of 1991.

Appellant is

merely asking this Court to withdraw from the marital division the
amount of the promissory notes that was wrongfully included in the
marital division between the time of the divorce and the time of
trial.

There is no request to value these promissory notes at any

different time period than the remainder of the estate.
For all of these reasons, therefore, this Court should
correct the present judgment and exclude the post-divorce
promissory notes as a marital asset.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE FULL AMOUNT OF DEBT THE
DEFENDANT OWED TO HIS MOTHER ISABEL COATS.
Appellee Kathryn Coats has been unable to cite any testimony
of Isabel Coats in which she directly stated that the total amount
owing by her son was $270,000.

The very best attempt by Appellee

consists of the following dialogue between Mr. Coats' attorney and
Mrs. Coats:
A. However, it was an open-ended note.
Q. You did not disburse money out at all with that?
A. The money was disbursed in increments from my Kidder
margin account as necessary for things in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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development.
Q. Now the need for the note are copies of several letters.
Can you tell us what those are?
A. This is what I was talking about.
Q. Are these letters copies of letters that were written by
you?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are written to Fred A.
Kidder-Peabody.
A. Yes.

Moreton at

He's my brother.

Q. You typically deal through him in relation to your
accounts?
A. Yes.
Q. Were these written at or about the time that you got—
the dates on these letters?
A. These letters are dated, as far as I know, exactly. I
would sometimes telephone, and then he would do it, and
I followed up with a letter: but usually it was written
in anticipation.
Q. But these represent draws against that note, $400,000.
A. Yes.

(Tr.

981-82).

(Emphasis added).

The testimony of Mrs. Coats is entirely consistent with the
argument now made by her son.

Exhibit 50 containing the note and

various letters attached to such note did in fact represent draws
against the $400,000 note.

She at no time, however, stated that

these were the only draws made against the note.
The Finding of Fact entered by the lower court, however, is
completely inconsistent with this testimony.

It states, "Isabel

Coats testified to the Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit
D-50 showed all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her.
(Finding No.

14(k)(2), Findings of Fact, pp.

17-18) (emphasis

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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added).

Such Finding is clearly not supported by the evidence.

This same Finding asserts:
"While the defendant's certified public account
testified on the amount of the notes stated that the
outstanding balance was $411,025, that amount was never
verified by Isabel Coats, and the Court cannot reconcile
in its mind the difference between the amount testified
to by the certified public accountant and the amount
testified to by defendant's mother, who is the creditor
on the notes." (Id.). (Emphasis added).
A review of the testimony of Isabel Coats shows that the
number "$270,000" never appears in either direct examination or
cross examination.

It is not until the closing argument by

Appellee's attorney that the assertion is made that she testified
that Exhibit D-50 was the entire amount.

The following statement

of Appellee's attorney evidences this fact:
Mr. Coats is bound by the testimony presented to
the Court, and the only evidence presented by the
defendant relating to that note was the credible
evidence of the creditor herself.
She said
and I ask you
see that this
letters which
made.

to the Court in her testimony, and D-50—
to look at that and add it up, and you'll
cover sheet is the note attached to it or
exhibit and evidence each loan that she
* * *

That Mrs. Coats testified to these letters and "all
the evidence of all the loans I made" and the very first
loan she said she made was a March, 1990 loan and that's
when they began.
And then we go through there and those add up, Your
Honor to $270,000. And the note doesn't say $400,000,
it says up to $400,000. (Tr. 1244-46).
Thus, the Court essentially stated that he would have found
the amount testified to by Appellant's accountants but for the
fact that this testimony was in direct contradiction to the amount
stated by the creditor herself.

As can be seen, however, no such
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contradiction occurred*
A similar type of situation occurred in McClellan v. David,
439 P.2d 673 (Nev.

1968).

In that case a secretary in the office

of the plaintiff's attorney testified with exactness that she had
conversed three times with the defendant by telephone soon after
he had been served with the summons about the necessity of his
filing an answer to the complaint.

Her recollection of the

conversation was refreshed from written notes made by her at the
time.

The defendant did not deny the conversations, but simply

testified he did not recall them.
defendant of his default.

The trial court relieved the

The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed.

The Court held that there was no fundamental conflict in the
testimony requiring it to adhere to the trial court's finding in
favor of the defendant.

The Court stated:

Testimony of a witness that he does not remember
whether a certain event took place does not contradict
positive testimony that such event or conversation took
place. Bender v. Roundup Mining Co., 356 P.2d 469,
471 (1960); Tennent v. Leary, 304 P.2d 384, 387
(1956). See also: Comment Note—Comparative Value of
Positive and Negative Testimony, 98 A.L.R. 161.
Therefore, we hold that there was no credible evidence
before the lower court to show that the neglect of [the
defendant] was excusable under the circumstances.
Id. at 675.
A nearly identical situation occurred in this case.
Appellant's accountant testified with precision as to the exact
amount that was owing on the debt, including documentation
supporting such figure.

Appellant's mother acknowledged the

existence of the $400,000 note but did not state any amount that
was specifically owed.

At no time did she state that the draws

contained in Exhibit 50 constituted the total amount borrowed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, the positive testimony of the accountant cannot be overcome
by the neutral testimony of Appellant's mother.
Since the findings of the lower court are not supported by
the evidence, the judgment of the court must be modified to
correctly reflect the entire amount borrowed by the appellant from
his mother.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
CHARGING APPELLANT WITH A MARITAL ASSET
VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON
DEVELOPMENT WHEN SUCH FINDING WAS NOT
BASED UPON ANY EVIDENCE.
There is little to say about this contention of Appellant.
Kathryn Coats has herself acknowledged that "The Court appears to
take an arbitrary position in valuing Brandon Canyon." (Appellee's
Brief, p. 21). The best that Appellee can do is to offer an
alternative scenario in which a worse result could have occurred.
This offer is simply not sufficient to overcome the fact that the
lower court made his ruling in an arbitrary manner.

Appellant

Peter Coats could also suggest ways in which the Court's decision
may have been reduced had he considered other formulas of
computation.

Obviously, however, neither the speculation of

Appellant or Appellee is sufficient to overcome the absence of any
sufficient evidence to support the finding of the lower court.
For this reason, therefore, the decision should be vacated
and remanded to allow the Court to make a proper evaluation based
upon evidence as to all facets of the project which were
unavailable at the time the Court made its ruling.
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POINT IV
ALTHOUGH THE COURT ORDERED APPELLANT TO
BE GIVEN A CREDIT OF $4,300 FOR APPELLEE'S
SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT, NO SUCH CREDIT
WAS EVER GIVEN IN THE ACTUAL ACCOUNTING.
Although this is a small issue in comparison to the amounts
involved in this divorce, the approach of the appellee is
enlightening.

Rather than acknowledging that a simple mistake has

been made and that the boat was never included in the revised
Exhibit P-91 which serves as the basis for the accounting between
the parties, Appellee states that Mr. Coats "will receive the
credit when he pays the estate equalization."
It is difficult to understand why Appellee is unable to admit
even the simplest error.

There is no doubt that paragraph 14(h)

quoted by the appellee (Appellee's Brief, p.
the $4,300 credit.

22) clearly awards

Until this finding is included in the actual

property distribution sheet, however, it is of no value.

The

property settlement sheet attached to the Court's decision must
therefore be amended to reflect this $4,300 credit.

Again, while

the mistake is small it is clearly there for all to see and
Appellee's assertion that "Appellant is mistaken regarding this
issue" is indicative of other arguments made thoughout her brief
which are not as apparent for their lack of substance.
CONCLUSION AS TO APPEAL OF APPELLANT
The issues raised by Appellant are simple, clear, and do not
involve discretionary decisions by the lower court.

Instead, they

involve miscalculations or errors in findings which are not based
upon the evidence existing in the record.
Appellee has failed to refute any of these contentions and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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therefore the relief requested should be granted.

PETER M. COATS RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL
Many of the issues raised by Kathryn Coats in her cross
appeal are now irrelevant and moot because of changed
circumstances.

Other challenge the discretion of the lower court

in various types of decision-making processes.

These arguments

will now be examined.
I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ALLOWING
APPELLANT TO VISIT HIS CHILDREN WITHOUT
SUPERVISION.
Kathryn Coats maintains that the lower court erred in failing
to require supervised visitation as she requested.

She contends

that the Court ignored the only evidence presented to this issue
which was offered by Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and Thomas Harrison.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-38).

She acknowledges that Appellant

himself testified as to his visitation desires as did Ms. Francis
Gomez who supervised some ten visits with the children.

Kathryn

Coats fails to mention that the Court was also able to observe
her in her testimony throughout the proceedings.

Based upon all

of this evidence the Court made the following Finding:
The Plaintiff has requested that the defendant
exercise visitation only in a supervised capacity.
However, the Court is persuaded that both parties have
problems which each of them have created for themselves
as parents and which have affected the emotional lives
of the children. While the Court has not interviewed
the children, it has read the reports of the therapists,
and it is clear that the children do have fear toward
their father, much of which has been generated by their
mother. The Court finds that there are two adults
before the Court who love their children, but have
committed acts against each other which have seriously
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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affected their children. There is concern about the
father's dysfunction and the mother informing the
children of his dysfunction. (Finding of Fact No. 2,
pp. 2-3).
In subsequent findings the Court observed that both parties
needed counseling in order to rebuild their relationship with
their children.

The Court also found that there was no evidence

to show that Mr. Coats had abused the children either physically
or sexually or anything to indicate that he was going to abuse the
children in any way.

In addition, the Court found there was no

evidence that the appellant was a pedophile or would engage in any
criminal activity toward the children.

(Findings 3, 4, and 5, pp.

3-4).
The lower court was not required to follow the
recommendations of the alleged experts offered by Kathryn
Coats.

It is fundamental that the testimony of witnesses is to be

given such weight and credibility as the trier of fact may find
reasonable under the circumstances.
P.2d 137 (Utah 1971).

Guinard v. Walton, 480

The Court was therefore completely

within its authority to believe or disbelieve any portion of the
testimony or reports offered by Appellee's witnesses.
Moreover, now that the children reside in Virginia the
appellant is able to see them only on infrequent occasions.
limited time together is an additional reason to allow
unsupervised visits so that he can attempt to rebuild his
relationship with his children.
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II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
DIRECTING THE APPELLEE TO REPLACE
MR. TOM HARRISON AS THE CHILDREN'S
COUNSELOR.
The trial court concluded there was a great deal of
antagonism between Mr. Tom Harrison and the appellant.

The Court

concluded that this antagonism was anti-productive in resolving
problems between the appellant and his children.

The Court

concluded that it would be "in the best interests of the parties
and the children to place the children with another therapist."
(Finding No. 7, p. 6).
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that another counselor would be more appropriate so that Appellant
could attend counseling sessions with his children.

Obviously, if

antagonism existed between the counselor and the appellant, a
non-productive session would likely result.
Appellant Peter Coats is again perplexed why this issue is
even raised in this appeal.

His children and former wife now live

in Virginia and Mr. Harrison practices in Salt Lake.

Even if the

Court had ordered Mr. Harrison to continue his therapy it is
apparent that such relationship would have terminated upon this
distant move.

Likewise, an order reversing this decision would

have no effect since Mr. Harrison would be physically unable to
counsel the children at the present time.

For this reason,

Appellant believes that the circumstances have changed during the
appeal thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no
legal effect.

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.,

659 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1983).
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III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN DIRECTING THAT ALIMONY WOULD TERMINATE
TEN YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT.
In limiting Appellee's alimony to a ten-year period the Court
noted that in light of the parties ages, and the potential ability
of the appellee to earn income, the award of alimony should not be
without a time limitation.

(Finding No. 12, p. 10).

Kathryn Coats has failed in her burden to produce facts and
evidence showing that the decision of the lower court is
incorrect.

Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991).

Certainly,

with the substantial property award given to the appellee by the
Court together with her age and earning ability, an award of
$240,000 over a ten-year period cannot be said to be an abuse of
discretion.
Appellant Peter Coats also asserts that upon information and
belief, Kathryn Coats was remarried in the summer of 1993 and
therefore under Utah law any award of alimony immediately ceases.
(§30-3-5(5), U.C.A.).

Assuming that such marriage did occur then

this issue would also be moot and not subject to appellate
review.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
VALUATION OF THE NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS.
Appellee Kathryn Coats asserts that the lower court erred in
valuating the Northridge property at $4,500 when the only
"evidence" was the testimony of appellant Peter Coats himself.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 41-42).
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 contains an appraisal of the
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furnishings by Mr. John Davis of the entire Northridge household
of numerous individual items.

This estimate by a professional

appraiser showed a total value of all furnishings of approximately
$7,300.

Mr. Davis testified that these prices were based upon

what he would expect to sell them for at a retail value, not what
he would expect to buy them for.

(Tr.

577). A review of this

exhibit shows the marginal value of used furniture when it is
being resold.

For example, a queen anne style low boy in good

condition is listed for $65.00. A JVC stereo system, multiple CD
player, tuner, amplifier, cassette deck, turntable, and simulated
oak cabinet is listed for $200.00.

Sterling flatware in a

mahogany silver chest with approximately 50 pieces is listed for
$210.00.
Appellant testified as to his opinion of certain items that
were not listed in Exhibit 2 which he felt had been omitted.
Appellee's counsel prepared Exhibit 80 and attempted to elicit Mr.
Coats' admission that this was a correct value.

Mr. Coats did not

agree, however, and stated the following:
This is a value just to show some things were left
out. I think the way the values have gone from the
testimony of the appraisers, they came through and they
absolutely do a fire sale on it. So these might be a
retail value, then from that value we would have to
establish a market value. I don't think we talked about
market value. We talked about what they were purchased
for and what they are going to go through, and I just
wanted to have a choice in the items that I received
instead of them being hidden in Virginia. (Tr.
1455-56).
Based upon the testimony of Appellee's own appraiser as to
the value of used furniture, the lower court was justified in
concluding that the retail value suggested by the appellant was
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1 Q -

only approximately one-fourth of the actual market value that
these items would sell for in a commercial setting*

Determining

and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial
court and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations
absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

Yelderman v.

Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983).
It should also be noted that the purpose of this valuation
was to give Appellee a credit for the furniture after she had
delivered it to Mr. Coats.

As of this date, however, Mr. Coats

has yet to receive any of the items listed on Exhibit 80.

If this

Court were to increase the valuation to $18,000 as now requested
by Appellee, and if Appellee fails to deliver these items to
Appellant as required, then it would be Appellant who would be
entitled to the increased valuation credit.

Thus, this contention

of Kathryn Coats could ultimately be detrimental to her own
financial interests.
••

v .

<•'•+

:

' '

THE CLAIM CONCERNING TARGET CAPITAL AS
AN ASSET IS A NON-ISSUE.
Appellee asserts that "both parties agreed that Target
Capital was an asset."

(Appellee's Brief, p. 42). No citation is

given for this statement.

Likewise, there is no explanation as to

any "value" stipulated by both parties or that Appellant would be
given this as an asset.

Appellant asserts that Target Capital has

absolutely no value and therefore it is immaterial whether it
would be given to him or to his former wife.

There was no

testimony concerning this asset since it had no value.

The lower

court was correct in completely discarding this non-existent asset.
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VI.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO AWARD APPELLEE THE LIABILITY CLAIMED
BY HER FATHER AS TO PROMISSORY NOTES SHE
HAD EXECUTED.
Appellee Kathryn Coats makes the unusual argument that she is
entitled to be reimbursed by appellant Peter Coats for promissory
notes that she executed to her father in the amount of $40,000.
She acknowledges that most of this money went to attorneys1 fees
and expert witness fees as well as living expenses.

She

subsequently makes two separate claims as will be discussed infra
for attorney fees and witness fees.

Essentially, therefore, she

wishes Mr. Coats to pay the entire liability to her father and
then to pay her separately for assessed attorneys fees and witness
fees which she also claims are due.

Such double dipping cannot be

allowed.
Appellee has cited no authority which requires a spouse to
pay a relative of a former spouse for monetary expenses advanced.
If her father's money was utilized for attorneys* fees and other
reimbursable expenses, then when she receives such amount from
Appellant she can certainly reimburse her father.

This divorce

action is clearly between Kathryn Coats and Peter Coats and not
between Peter Coats and Kenneth Tuck, Appellee's father.
Essentially, whatever money is due between Peter and Kathryn
for alimony, temporary support, attorneys' fees, and witness fees,
is irrelevant to any debt incurred by Appellee to her father.

Had

Appellee gone to a bank and borrowed money for these same expenses
the bank could make no direct claim against Mr. Coats for payment
of Appellee's debt.

This same result applies here and the Court
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was correct in denying any liability to Appellee's father.
VII.
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS
AWARD AS TO ATTORNEYS FEES.
Appellant has no dispute with the legal authorities cited by
Kathryn Coats in her Brief.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 43-44).

Certainly, a court has wide discretion in deciding how much, if
any, attorneys' fees should be awarded from one spouse to the
other.

Appellee maintains that "the Court made no finding on the

total legal fees but simply ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000
of those fees, offering no explanation for the reduction and the
failure to recognize the liability to Mr. Tuck." (Appellee's
Brief, p. 44). This statement is incorrect.

The lower court

offered the following explanation for the attorney fee award:
The Court would also order that—would find, first,
that the defendant has more ability to pay the
attorneys' fees in this matter than the plaintiff has,
and would award attorneys' fees in the amount of
$20,000.
I'm not saying that this is total fees in this
case, I'm saying that's the total amount that this Court
would award.
I think the attorneys' fees were generated here
unnecessarily—I'm not putting that right; I'm saying
that the attorneys' fees were generated necessarily, but
I'm saying that the attorney fees had—the attorneys had
to do work which this Court deems was unnecessary
because either as a result of uncooperation of the
parties or because of events that took place as far as
the case is concerned. (Tr. 565-66).
See also Finding No.

20 in which the Court finds that the

appellee has incurred substantial attorneys' fees in excess of
$40,000 and that a reasonable amount for Appellant to contribute
to the appellee is $20,000).
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Clearly, the Court took into account the financial need of
the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay
together with the conduct of both spouses in generating the fees.
This award was not an abuse of discretion.
VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
AWARD APPELLEE REASONABLE FEES FOR
EXPERTS.
The lower court denied Appellee's request for expert witness
fees on the basis that her request was overly broad under Utah
law.
In addition to this legal ground, there was insufficient
evidence before the court to justify such fees.

The only evidence

was Appellee's testimony that she had incurred these fees and
that she wished to be reimbursed for them.

Unlike the detailed

summary of attorneys' fees offered as evidence in this case
(see Plaintiff's Exhibit 37 as contained in Appendix of
Respondent and Cross Appellant) there was no evidence as to the
breakdown of the alleged expert fees or testimony that such fees
were reasonable under community standards.

This lack of

foundation was itself sufficient for the lower court to deny these
fees regardless of any other reason the court may have utilized.
IX.
DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT UNDER RECENT
LAW THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
CHILDREN AS TAX DEDUCTIONS TO THE APPELLANT.
In view of recent decisions by this Court and federal courts,
Appellant acknowledges that the lower court under today's
standards did not satisfactorily justify the award of one child as
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an exemption on Appellant's federal tax return or two children if
Appellee was unable to utilize such exemption on her return.
Appellant, therefore, agrees that this provision of the
Divorce Decree may be amended to provide that Appellee receive all
exemptions.
CONCLUSION
Before this Court can justify relief to Appellee as to her
cross appeal, it must find that the lower court abused its
discretion in making the various awards and decisions of which
Appellee now complains.

As noted in the context of argument, some

of these issues are now moot or irrelevant because of
circumstances which have changed since the trial.

In other

instances, the lower court was justified in the decision based
upon the financial status of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding the divorce.
With the exception of the tax exemption issue, therefore, the
present judgment should be affirmed in its entirety as to the
claims now being asserted by Appellee on her cross appeal.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 1994.

Craig S. Co^k
Attorney for Appellant and
Cross Appellee
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